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Abstract 
Prognostic Health Management (PHM) is an emerging technology that provides the framework for being able to monitor a product’s health, 
whilst in service.  In order to be able to apply (PHM) to a system, a comprehensive analysis of the common causes of faults within the system 
needs to be carried out.  This paper presents a review of fault causes within a military radar system using a Failure Modes Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and puts together a framework for applying prognostics in order to monitor the health of the system.  A review 
of the reliability and degradation mechanisms in RF devices is also presented. 
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1. Introduction 
The ability to be able to monitor a product’s health whilst 
in service is beneficial on numerous grounds such as 
predicting critical failures, remaining useful life (RUL) and 
moving towards an extension of service life, thus moving 
away from traditional set interval service periods.  Prognostic 
Health Management (PHM) is methodology that allows the 
monitoring of products state of health in real time, and 
therefore leads to a prediction of the above criteria, as well as 
this, costs from downtime due to scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance may be reduced.  
A significant body of work on PHM has been developed 
around the methods to implement such techniques within 
electronic systems in general [1], however little has been done 
to address health monitoring in the RF and Embedded area.  
2. PHM for RF and radar systems 
Traditionally, PHM has been implemented using 
approaches that are either model-based or data-driven. The 
model-based approaches to PHM use mathematical 
representations to incorporate a physical understanding of the 
system, and include both system modelling and physics-of-
failure (PoF) modelling. Prognosis of remaining useful life 
(RUL) is carried out based on knowledge of the processes 
causing degradation and leading to failure of the system. 
The PoF approach utilizes knowledge of a system’s life-
cycle loading conditions, geometry, and material properties to 
identify potential failure mechanisms and estimate RUL. This 
approach is based on the understanding that failures occur due 
to fundamental mechanical, chemical, electrical, thermal, and 
radiation processes. 
Data-driven techniques are used to learn from the data and 
intelligently provide valuable decision-making information. 
They are based on the assumption that the statistical 
characteristics of the system data remain relatively unchanged 
until a fault occurs in the system. Anomalies and trends or 
patterns are detected in data collected by in situ monitoring to 
determine the state of health of a system. The trends are then 
used to estimate the time to failure of the system. 
In this approach, in situ monitoring of environmental and 
operational loads and system parameters is carried out. The 
data collected is analysed using a variety of techniques 
depending on the type of data available. For example, if data 
representing the healthy and faulty states of the system are 
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available, a supervised learning approach is used. When data 
for only one class, such as the healthy state of the system, are 
available, then the semi-supervised approach is used. A third 
approach is the unsupervised learning approach, which is used 
when no labelled data are available. Decisions about the 
system health are typically made using assumptions regarding 
the system data. It should be noted that employing both the 
supervised and semi-supervised learning techniques requires 
reliable training data. This is important, as the classification of 
incoming data is dependent on the training data, and 
unreliable training data will lead to errors in detection. 
In addition to detection, an important aspect of data-driven 
approaches for PHM is prognostics. Although not as fully 
developed as detection, prediction of failure has been 
accomplished using a variety of techniques. The most 
important techniques are Markov chains, stochastic processes 
and time series analysis. These techniques use the past history 
to infer the future and continually update the prediction of 
RUL, providing an estimate of the associated prediction 
uncertainty.  
One of the limitations of data-driven approaches lies in the 
requirement of training data. Data-driven approaches depend 
on historical (e.g., training) system data to determine 
correlations, establish patterns, and evaluate data trends 
leading to failure. In many cases, there will be insufficient 
historical or operational data to obtain health estimates and 
determine trend thresholds for failure prognostics. A solution 
to this problem is to incorporate (or fuse) system models, such 
as (PoF) models, with the data-driven models. [2] 
The use of expendable devices such as fuses and canaries 
is commonplace in power supply applications. Fuses are 
commonly used as a weak link to prevent a faulty piece of 
equipment drawing too much current and causing damage to 
other components, or presenting a hazard due to, for example, 
overheating.  The idea of a “canary” comes from the days of 
coal mining, where a canary was used as an early warning of 
the presence of hazardous gases.  Because the canary is more 
sensitive to the gases than a human, the death or sickening of 
the bird indicated to the miners to leave the area. 
The use of a canary in PHM situations involves mounting a 
device such as to indicate advanced failure due to specific 
wear out mechanisms. The one remaining unanswered 
question with the use of fuses and canaries is, if for example, 
the canary is replaced, what is the impact when the product is 
re-energised? [3] 
Fusion prognostic methodologies combine the strengths of 
the model-based and data-driven approaches, in order to 
estimate RUL under both operating and non-operating life 
cycle conditions, detect anomalous behaviour or intermittent 
faults, identify precursors to failure for effective maintenance 
planning, identify the potential processes causing system 
failure and the nature and extent of the fault for effective 
maintenance strategies. [4] 
2.1. PHM for radar  
The work carried out so far within utilising PHM for 
monitoring Radar systems is very much in its infancy.  A 
small amount of work has been carried out on implementing 
PHM in RF systems, and is based around the monitoring of 
parameters in a system to give a prognosis of degradation and 
failure [5][6][8]. What is proposed here is a framework for 
building a PHM methodology for Radar systems.  
2.1.1. Identification of fault causes 
The starting point for implementing PHM on any system is 
to determine the most common cause of faults. This may be in 
terms of the cost, maintenance downtime or more crucially in 
terms of being safety critical. The process of detecting and 
isolating faults that have already occurred is known as 
“diagnostics”.  “Prognostics” is the process of predicting a 
future state of system reliability. [3]  
For all systems, not just RF and Radar, the identification of 
failure precursors and developing prognostics is dependent on 
the faults that may occur. Parameters to monitor are also 
diverse and may largely depend on the architecture and 
relative operating frequencies of the circuits. 
One way to identify these parameters is the use of a failure 
mode analysis technique such as Failure Mode Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA). This should be carried out 
throughout the system, sub-systems and at component/device 
level, from this analysis, critical systems, sub-systems and 
components or circuitry may be identified.  The use of other 
material such as maintenance documentation, failure 
reporting, analysis and corrective action system (FRACAS), 
Defect Report and Corrective Action System (DRACAS) and 
first-hand knowledge may also help if they are specific 
enough. 
Table 1 on the following page shows an example of 
failures that could be identified on RF and Radar systems as a 
result of such an investigation. 
Brown et al. [5] identify a MOSFET as the main failure 
mode mechanism, as most of the circuit components on the 
high frequency side make use of the device. The device was 
then analysed and prior device parameter failure information 
was used to arrive at the conclusion that the breakdown of the 
dielectric can lead to a failure mode known as Time 
Dependant Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB), which can 
gradually occur during normal operating conditions causing 
changes in charge-voltage and current-voltage device 
characteristics.  This in turn may affect the devices 
performance parameters, such as gain, trans-conductance, 
series resistance and threshold voltage. 
The authors also found the variations in any device, at high 
frequencies, either active or passive, can cause the following 
circuit characteristics to change significantly enough to 
present problems when exposed to extremes, such as high 
temperatures for example: 
x Phase response 
x Frequency response 
x Linearity 
x Gain 
x Impedance matching 
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 Table 1. Example faults for RF and radar systems 
RF subsystem Failure precursor parameter Measurement 
parameter 
Fixed antennas, 
including arrays 
Mismatching 
Waveguide damage to antenna 
S-Parameters 
VSWR 
Dish antennas 
plus associated 
turning gear 
Mismatching 
Waveguide damage to antenna 
Bearings 
S-Parameters 
VSWR 
Vibration 
RF cables and 
connectors 
Reflection 
Corrosion 
Moisture Ingress 
Heating 
S-parameter 
TDR 
Third-order 
intercept (3IP) 
Main equipment 
transceivers and 
parameter 
measurement 
units 
 
Phase response 
Frequency response 
Linearity 
Gain 
Impedance matching 
BER 
Phase 
Power / Voltage 
S-Parameters 
Third-order 
intercept point (3IP) 
Main equipment 
RF Power 
transmitters, 
including HT 
transformer 
Voltage standing wave ratio 
Power dissipation 
Leakage current 
S-Parameters 
VSWR 
Power 
Current 
VLSI 
digitisation 
Supply leakage current 
Supply current variation 
Operating signature 
Current Noise 
Logic level variation 
Voltage 
Current 
Jitter 
Distortion 
General purpose 
DSP / DP 
processing 
boards and 
associated 
software 
Supply leakage current 
Supply current variation 
Operating signature 
Current Noise 
Logic level variation 
Voltage 
Current 
Jitter 
Distortion 
Video display 
units and 
graphics 
processors 
Visual image corruption 
Power rail fluctuations 
Voltage 
Scan-Frequency 
Digital data 
cables and 
connectors 
Mechanical wear out, 
Corrosion 
Loose connection 
Continuity 
TDR 
 
Control cables 
and connectors 
 
Mechanical wear out, 
Corrosion 
Loose connection 
Continuity 
TDR 
Power cables 
and connectors 
Mechanical wear out, 
Corrosion 
Loose connection 
Continuity 
TDR 
Cabinets and 
environment 
control 
equipment 
Excessive Temperature 
Humidity 
Temperature & 
Humidity 
DC/DC power 
conversion units 
DC output (voltage and current 
levels) 
Ripple 
Pulse width duty cycle 
Efficiency 
Feedback (voltage and current 
levels) 
Leakage current 
RF noise 
Transistor 
Temperature 
Power efficiency of 
transistor and 
current transfer ratio 
Temperature profile 
Power efficiency &  
output voltage 
 
Once the failure precursor has been identified, 
measurement parameters need to be identified.  For example, 
for identifying damage or mismatches in the case of antennas, 
the monitoring of s-parameter to give indications of reflection 
and voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR) can be used.  In the 
case of looking at cables and interconnects for damage, 
continuity, inter-modulation distortion and time domain 
reflection (TDR) may be used. Voltage, current and power 
parameters are suitable for a wide variety of measurement 
techniques, for example by monitoring the output of power 
supplies, logic levels, transistor parameters, power plane 
integrity, ripple and leakage.  Additionally, more esoteric 
parameters may be used such as jitter, distortion and error 
coding. [6] Nanduri, S. et al. show that the use of Cyclic 
Redundancy Checks (CRC), gives a precursor to failure and 
can be used for prognostics.  
Other more external parameters such as temperature, 
humidity, vibration and corrosion may be monitored. In the 
latter a canary could be used a precursor to indicate failure. 
More work needs to be done, in order to understand the 
failures, and precursors to failures in RF and microwave 
components and systems.  The parameters suggested here for 
measurement also need to be adapted in some cases for use at 
a system level. 
2.1.2. Monitoring of the parameters 
Faults that are identified within the Radar system need to 
be monitored. Due to the complexity, cost, reliability and 
safety aspects, it may be preferable where possible to avoid 
the fitting of new sensor equipment to legacy equipment. 
One way to monitor faults, using existing parameter 
measurements is by looking at the data from existing Built in 
Test (BIT).  BIT has been around in electronic systems for a 
long time and is the first attempt at diagnostic health 
monitoring.  BIT may give more detail of faults depending on 
the size of the system and how it is embedded.  Circuit Level 
(Built In Self-Test), Module Assembly Level (Instrument 
LRUIWRA), System Level Self Contained Testing (Self-
Test/Diagnostic/Operational Assurance Testing). [7] 
The use of BIT in the development of a PHM system for 
Radar is largely dependent on what level of implementation 
has been designed into the system. However, it does offer a 
viable starting platform for data driven techniques and 
combined with PoF models could offer significant prognostic 
advantages. 
The reported benefits of BIT include shorter down times 
due to reduced fault finding time and fewer removals of 
operational units, resulting in reduced life cycle cost [8].  But 
there always exists a trade-off, which leads to compromising 
the effectiveness of the BIT. One of the major concerns for a 
packaging and design engineer is the size of the BIT logic. 
Fault coverage and overheads are directly driven by size of 
the BIT. 100% fault coverage will also lead to increase in the 
overheads involved in the design and implementation of the 
BIT. Hence, application of BIT is always a compromise of 
cost and effectiveness [9].  The success of BIT depends upon 
its design, Zhang, Y & Ma, Y [10] have produced a study on 
the BIT testability verification and evaluating modelling 
method, the link and potential problems between its 
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verification and evaluation have been found. The paper 
introduces the design of BIT based on a radar system and puts 
forward the design and the evaluation plan for a radar 
transmission system. 
To give an example for an actual Radar system [10] Xie, 
G.-J.et al., who have developed a PHM system for an 
Airborne Early Warning Radar identified 250 parameters that 
are monitored in the AEW Radar through the BIT. These 
include output power, operating frequency, pulse repetition 
frequency, width, amplitude and phase, etc. in the transmitter 
subsystem; the mixer crystal current, gain, sensitivity, 
intermediate frequency, video pulse and detection circuit 
current, etc. in the transceiver subsystem; the pulse 
compression ratio and FFT number etc. in the signal 
processing subsystem; the beam amplitude and phase, and the 
power voltage, etc. in the beam forming and control 
subsystem; the pressure, flow capacity and temperature, etc. 
in the cooling subsystem. 
 Being able to predict a component's or system's life from 
the parameters it is exposed to is the basis of Physics of 
Failure methodology. The PoF methodology is founded on 
parameters such as mechanical, electrical, chemical, thermal, 
and radiation stresses that lead to failures in components. The 
objective is then to calculate the damage due to cumulative 
failure mechanisms for a product in a given environment [4].  
To develop usefully accurate models for microwave and 
RF components, work is needed to enable these parameters to 
be identified and models produced. 
For accurate prognostics a combination of both PoF and 
data driven offers the best of both methodologies, the ability 
to isolate the root cause of failure based on PoF and to take 
into account the monitoring of the complexity of the system 
using the parameters discussed above. 
3. RF device reliability issues and failure effects 
In general, semiconductors have a very-low wear out 
failure rate in early life and then have increasing failure rates 
as they wear out.  A small population may fail early in life, so 
called 'infant mortality', but these failures tend to be 
associated with manufacturing or assembly defects.  As 
semiconductor reliability improves and more samples are 
stressed, the early failures become easier to eliminate. 
For semiconductor devices the wear out mechanisms tends 
to differ significantly, silicon (Si) devices have different 
failure mechanisms than compound semiconductors such as 
Gallium Arsenide (GaAs).  First of all, the metallisation used 
in GaAs is gold, which is more conductive than the 
aluminium used in conventional silicon devices, it is also less 
susceptible to electro-migration.  Electro-migration is a 
diffusion process, gold's melting point is significantly higher 
than aluminium, (1064°C) as opposed to (660°C), as 
diffusivity scales with melting point, and gold is less prone to 
diffusion.  Other advantages of gold is its stability, it is 
generally less susceptible to corrosion and does not form 
stable oxides. 
GaAS devices tend to use a MESFET configuration and 
unlike Si MOSFET devices, gates are formed by Schottky 
metal contacts to the channel, instead of using gate oxides.  
This eliminates the primary failure mechanisms found in 
MOSFET devices, due to immunity from surface effects and 
ionic contamination, which dominate in Si devices [12]. 
The failure mechanisms in semiconductor devices fall into 
the following categories; material-interaction, stress, 
mechanical and environmental induced [13]. 
Table 2. Types of failures in semiconductor devices 
Category Failure mechanism 
Material-interaction Gate-metal Sinking within FET Devices  
Ohmic Contact Degradation Channel 
Degradation  
Surface-state Effects  
Package Moulding contamination  
Stress Electro-migration  
Burnout  
Hot Electron trapping  
Electrical Stress 
Mechanical Die fracture  
Die-attach voids  
Solder joint failure 
Environmental Temperature 
Humidity & Hydrogen Effects 
 
The most applicable of these effects to RF devices, will be 
discussed in more depth below. 
 
The main failure mechanism within small signal GaAs 
FET is well understood having being extensively investigated, 
[12- 15] cite the gate metal inter-diffusion as being the 
dominant failure mode.  Gate metal inter-diffusion into the 
channel or 'sinking gates', causes the effective channel 
thickness to be reduced.  The largest change being the 
decrease in channel current so that parameter is typically used 
as a failure criteria.  A 20% change in channel current is 
usually the defined failure rate.  In addition to the channel 
current changes, the resistance of the channel increases and 
the magnitude of voltage required to pinch-off a FET is 
reduced (usually making pinch-offs more positive).  The 
problem of sinking gates is not catastrophic and is usually 
self-limiting due to the channel current reducing and hence 
the power available in the FET reduces, this causes a 
reduction in temperature, causing the gate to sink more 
slowly.  Degradation due to sinking gate mechanism of failure 
is accelerated by temperature without bias or RF Drive [12]. 
Ohmic contact failure mechanisms have also been studied 
on GaAs devices [16], but degradation methods have been 
elusive.  Other types of degradation mechanism have been 
identified for Silicon-Germanium (SiGe) HBTs such as 
impact-ionization stress, scaling induced low-frequency noise 
variations and impact of ionizing radiation, as well as self 
heating and electrical stress causing degradation of DC 
current gain. 
In silicon devices, problems such as electro-migration are 
more prevalent as they tend to use aluminium instead of gold 
causing a larger exchange between the current-carrying 
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electrons and the host metal lattice, aluminium ions can drift 
in the direction of the electron current.  Due to the presence of 
flux divergence centres, vacancies start to cluster, clusters 
grow into voids, and the voids can continue until they block 
the current flow in the aluminium.  This causes the current to 
be forced to flow through the supporting barrier layer and/or 
capping layer; the resulting increase in resistance leads to 
device failure.  Since this is a mass conserving process, 
accumulations of the transported aluminium ions increase the 
mechanical stress in supporting dielectrics and may cause 
shorts and fractures to occur [12]. 
Hot carrier injection is a problem that manifests itself 
within certain types of silicon based RF power amplifies such 
as LD-MOSFETS.  The problem causes drift in the quiescent 
operating point.  It was discovered that the quiescent drain 
current at the chosen operating DC gate bias voltage changed 
by more than 20 percent over the operating life of the 
products.  The changes in the quiescent drain current has 
significant adverse impact on the linearity of the transistor 
because the quiescent drain current is optimised for delivering 
the best combination of linearity and efficiency in RF power 
amplifiers.  Better performance has been achieved with 
modern devices, having a drift in drain current reduced to less 
than 5% in 20 year life span [17].  
Hot carrier injection describes the phenomena by which 
carriers gain sufficient energy to be injected into the gate 
oxide.  This occurs as carriers move along the channel of a 
MOSFET and experience impact ionisation near the drain end 
of the device.  The damage can occur at the interface, within 
the oxide and/or within the sidewall spacer.  Interface-state 
generation and charge trapping induced by this mechanism 
result in transistor parameter degradation, typically as 
switching frequency degradation rather than 'hard' functional 
failure [10]. 
As well as the failures mentioned above which are caused 
by metal interaction and stress, consideration of corrosion, 
mechanical and environmental degradation must also be 
considered. 
Devices with aluminium or aluminium alloys with small 
percentages of copper and silicon metallisation are prone to 
corrosion failures [12,13].  Corrosion occurs due to the 
presence of contaminates and moisture in these metallisation.  
Failures due to corrosion fall into two groups; namely, 
bonding-pad corrosion or internal corrosion.  Bond pad 
corrosion is more common because the die pad passivation 
does not cover the metallisation in the bond pad locations.  
Internal corrosion is usually attributed to damage or weakness 
in the die passivation, allowing moisture to reach the 
metallisation [13]. 
Temperature cycling and thermal shock can cause fatigue 
failures, especially in devices that exhibit a lot of power.  
Permanent damage accumulates during thermal cycling; 
accumulating each time the device undergoes a normal 
power-up, power-down cycle.  Such cycles can induce a 
cyclic stress that tends to weaken materials and may cause a 
number of different failures, including dielectric/thin-film 
cracking, lifted bonds, fractured/broken bond wires, solder 
fatigue (joint/ball/bump), cracked die and lifted die [13].  
Finally, the introduction of lead free solder in manufacture 
has resulted in problems of reliability associated with ‘tin 
whiskers’. A tin whisker is a conductive tin crystal, which 
grows spontaneously from tin finished surfaces, often in a 
needle-like form. Whisker related field failures, resulting in 
over US$1Billion, have been reported by the electronics 
industry. The major failure risks are current leakage and 
shorting due to bridging of adjacent conductors [18] 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the framework necessary for 
applying PHM to RF systems such as Radar.  A brief review 
of PHM has been presented.  System level faults using a 
FMECA analysis have been identified and the methodologies 
to enable the monitoring of parameters to indicate degradation 
have also been discussed.  Finally, the reliability, degradation 
and root cause of failures within RF devices have been 
presented. 
In order to be able to apply PHM to the types of failures 
presented in table 1, considerable work need to be done in 
studying how existing technologies such as BIT can be used, 
as well as the development of new methodologies and sensor 
technologies, that can be used to monitor the degradation 
within each subsystem. 
4.1. Future work 
From the conclusions drawn in the above work, it would be 
beneficial to implement prognostic capability within RF and 
radar systems.  The next stage of this project will be to 
research and investigate a methodology which allows PHM to 
be implemented within a RF transceiver chain. It is envisaged 
this will be based upon extracting parametric data from the 
system and utilising data driven techniques to compare this to 
the ideal.  The differential, thus being using used with a 
prognostic algorithm to determine the RUL.   
The challenges faced will be to extract this data with the 
minimum of interference to normal operation and without 
compromising the system itself. 
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